President Bola Tinubu got here into workplace promising that “Nigeria is again,” then framed his international coverage across the now-familiar “4Ds”: Democracy, Improvement, Demography, and Diaspora. Two years on, his file exhibits significant motion on financial statecraft and regional disaster administration, but in addition expensive execution gaps which have blunted Nigeria’s leverage. The subsequent two years can nonetheless be decisive, if Abuja converts headline-grabbing bulletins into bankable tasks, repairs its regional coalition, and fixes the equipment of Nigerian diplomacy.
What Tinubu Has Tangibly Gained
1) A revived pipeline for giant financial offers
Tinubu has put presidential weight behind high-value industrial diplomacy:
Germany–Siemens “Presidential Energy Initiative.” Abuja and Berlin re-upped the power-sector overhaul at COP28, and Nigeria has since moved into Section 2, an try and translate an oft-stalled venture into grid upgrades that ease Nigeria’s vitality bottleneck. If delivered, that’s the single most growth-relevant “diplomatic” win on the desk.
Saudi Arabia engagement. Riyadh pledged refinery funding and help for Nigeria’s foreign-exchange reforms; Abuja later sought a multibillion-dollar commerce facility. The Saudi observe provides Nigeria choices past Western lenders and, if structured effectively, can crowd in personal capital for vitality and logistics.
Brazil re-set. Petrobras’ return and 5 new MoUs, with an air hyperlink to São Paulo. level to a extra purposeful South-South hall in oil, agriculture, and aviation.
G20 channel. Nigeria leveraged its 2023 invitation to the G20 Leaders’ Summit to court docket funding and has stayed plugged into South Africa’s 2025 presidency (together with an invite to host a G20-linked occasion). Even with out membership, that platform expands Nigeria’s convening energy.
Why this issues: Nigeria’s progress constraint is just not concepts however execution capital, secure energy, logistics, and FX depth. Utilizing summitry to unlock these inputs is exactly what financial diplomacy ought to do.
2) Recalibrating ECOWAS disaster administration
Mr Tinubu’s early “crimson line” in opposition to coups collided with political actuality, however the shift from coercion to engagement was in the end pragmatic: ECOWAS lifted most sanctions on Niger (and a few on different junta-ruled states) in February 2024, opening channels for safety cooperation and humanitarian aid. Abuja then pursued a safety MoU with Niamey. These strikes preserved residual affect at the same time as three Sahel states (Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger) proceeded with formal withdrawal from ECOWAS in January 2025.
Why this issues: Nigeria’s strategic depth rests on a functioning near-abroad. The pivot from maximal sanctions to selective engagement stored de-escalation choices alive and restricted spillovers on commerce and cross-border safety.
3) A coherent (and communicable) doctrine
The “4Ds” have given Abuja a brief, exportable story about its international coverage. No matter one thinks of the branding, it has helped align ministerial speaking factors and sign priorities (diaspora finance, youth demography, democratic norms).
The place the Positive aspects Fell Quick
1) Guarantees outpaced inflows
Nigerian officers touted tens of billions in funding “commitments,” but measured FDI stays weak and a number of other flagship pledges are nonetheless on the MoU or feasibility stage. The credibility hole between bulletins and disbursements has fed scepticism amongst traders.
2) Regional management dented
Regardless of Abuja’s efforts, the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) formalised its exit from ECOWAS in 2025. That could be a structural hit to Nigeria’s integration agenda (commerce, mobility, safety). Rebuilding an structure that works with or across the AES is now unavoidable statecraft, not elective idealism.
3) UAE channel unresolved
Stories and counter-reports about visa normalisation and shifting guidelines have left Nigerians and airways in limbo. For a journey, remittance, and aviation hall as consequential because the UAE, ambiguity has prices.
The Strategic To-Do Listing: How Tinubu Can Maximise Diplomatic Dividends
A. Convert MoUs to megawatts, cargo, and jobs (12–24-month supply agenda)
1. Energy: Ring-fence Siemens Section 2 with a sovereign-backed completion account and impartial venture monitoring; publish a quarterly scorecard with sub-targets (substations commissioned, ATC&C loss cuts, grid uptime). Tie disbursements to verifiable milestones.
2. Vitality/business: Package deal the Saudi refinery and Petrobras tracks as bankable tasks, clear allowing timelines, FX entry guidelines, and local-content necessities that don’t scare off EPC contractors. Use a fast-track “One-Cease Funding Room” in Abuja to chop land, port, and offtake bottlenecks.
3. Commerce corridors: Leverage the brand new Lagos–São Paulo air hyperlink for perishables and pharma provide chains; negotiate mutual recognition for requirements and “inexperienced lanes” at customs to show flights into freight worth, not simply passenger volumes.
B. Rebuild West Africa’s security-economy compact, with versatile geometry
4. Safety compacts that coexist with politics: Institutionalise Nigeria–Niger joint operations in opposition to ISWAP and bandit networks no matter ECOWAS politics; broaden intelligence fusion cells alongside the Sokoto–Kebbi–Zamfara and Lake Chad axes.
5. Variable-geometry ECOWAS: Provide AES states à-la-carte participation—commerce facilitation, cross-border funds, energy pooling—even when political integration pauses. Pair this with a Sahel Stabilisation Facility (arms-length from ECOWAS) to finance roads, fibre, and border markets that make exit economically expensive over time.
6. Individuals-first sanctions doctrine: Codify a rule that any future ECOWAS sanctions embrace automated humanitarian carve-outs and time-bound critiques; Nigeria ought to champion this after studying from the Niger episode.
C. Repair the diplomatic machine that should ship the entire above
7. Appoint, empower, and fund: Conclude ambassadorial appointments with a competency-first slate (deal-makers to the G20 and Gulf posts; protection-of-national’s specialists to migration hotspots). Entrance-load This autumn/Q1 working funds to missions to finish arrears and reputational injury.
8. Create an Funding Supply Unit (IDU) in State Home, co-chaired by Overseas Affairs, Finance, and Energy, with a 10-project mandate (Siemens grid nodes, refinery rehab, Lagos logistics parks, fuel processing). Publish month-to-month dashboards; let ambassadors escalate blockages straight to the IDU. (Nigeria’s drawback is just not “appeal to”—it’s “execute.”)
D. Flip “Diaspora” from slogan to balance-of-payments instrument
9. Diaspora finance: Concern rolling diaspora bonds (quick tenors, quarterly home windows) and digitise KYC by way of remittance apps. Earmark proceeds to energy and airport modernisation; publish use-of-proceeds audits to beat the belief deficit.
10. Consular reform: Standardise five-day passport renewals at high-volume missions with service-level ensures; publish wait-time dashboards. Robust consular service is tender energy, and funding due diligence runs via embassies first.
E. Use local weather and meals safety to widen coalition companions
11. Local weather-for-growth diplomacy: At COP30-31 and the G20 Johannesburg cycle, spearhead a “Baseload for Africa” initiative (gas-to-power + grid finance labelled as transition-compatible). Provide credible methane-leak abatement at dwelling to unlock concessional local weather funds for grid upgrades.
12. Brazil–Nigeria meals hall: Flip the Brazil opening right into a bilateral on mechanisation, tropical seeds, and cargo cold-chain, the place each nations are complementary. Tie it to AfCFTA export targets to make it regionally scaling, not bilateral silo.
F. De-risk the UAE and aviation file
13. UAE detente: Desk a technical working group (Aviation/Inside/Overseas Affairs) with a 60-day deliverable: reciprocal visa classes, airline slots, and data-sharing on journey fraud. Sign certainty with a joint communiqué and up to date journey advisories. Ambiguity is pricey for households and carriers alike.
READ ALSO: EXCLUSIVE: Actual purpose Tinubu sacked presidential aide Fegho Umunubo
The Backside Line
President Tinubu has rebuilt entry to capital, to summits, and to counterparts, and he steered ECOWAS away from an escalation spiral in 2024. These are non-trivial positive aspects. However entry is just not the identical as affect. Affect comes when tasks change on, planes take off, borders keep open, and residents really feel it. That’s the reason the following part should be about supply self-discipline at dwelling and coalition administration overseas.
If Abuja locks the Siemens schedule, closes two or three Saudi/Brazil offers to monetary shut, restores an ambassadorial corps match for objective, and re-invents ECOWAS round sensible cooperation, Nigeria’s declare to regional management will now not relaxation on slogans. It should relaxation on infrastructure buzzing, meals shifting, and borders secured, the quiet proofs of diplomacy that works.
Victor LIMAN is the previous Chief Commerce Negotiator and Performing Director Common of the Nigerian Workplace for Commerce Negotiations. Mr. LIMAN can be the previous Head and Commissioner, Nigeria Regional Funding and Commerce Workplace, China, with the concurrent mandate to supervise Nigeria’s commerce and funding relations with South Jap Asian Nations. [email protected] (+234 7011276040).
